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Examining the Intended and Unintended Consequences of Organisational Privacy 
Safeguard Enactment in Healthcare: A Grounded Theory Investigation 
  
 
Abstract 
Research shows that despite organisational efforts to achieve privacy compliance, privacy breaches 
continue to rise. The extant studies on organisational privacy compliance concentrate on the extent to 
which privacy threats can be alleviated through a combination of technical and human controls and the 
positive (and often intended) influences of these controls. This focus inadvertently neglects unintended 
consequences such as impeded workflow in medical practices. To address this research conflict, this study 
uses an interpretive grounded theory research approach to investigate the consequences of privacy 
safeguard enactment in medical practices, including whether it influences their ability to meet privacy 
requirements and whether workflows are impeded. Our central contribution is a theoretical framework, 
the unintended consequences of privacy safeguard enactment (UCPSE) framework, which explicates the 
process by which privacy safeguards are evaluated and subsequently bypassed and the resulting influence 
on organisational compliance. The UCPSE highlights the importance of the imbalance challenge, which 
is the result of unintended consequences outweighing the intended consequences of privacy safeguard 
enactment. Failure to address the imbalance challenge leads to the adoption of workarounds that may 
ultimately harm the organisation’s privacy compliance. Despite several research calls, the consequences 
and effectiveness of organisational privacy efforts are largely missing from both information systems and 
health informatics research. This study is one of the first attempts to both systematically identify the 
impacts of privacy safeguard enactment and to examine its implications for privacy compliance in the 
healthcare domain. The findings also have practical implications for healthcare executives on the 
unintended consequences of privacy safeguard enactment and how they could alleviate the imbalance 
challenge to thwart workarounds and the subsequent negative effects on privacy compliance.  
 
Keywords 
Information privacy, privacy safeguards, healthcare, imbalance challenge, grounded theory, interpretive 
research, unintended consequences, intended consequences, the unintended consequences of privacy 
safeguard enactment (UCPSE) framework 
Introduction 
Organisational governance of the information privacy of patient healthcare records has grown 
into a serious problem, and the U.S. requires healthcare providers to adhere to the strong information 
privacy protections outlined in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) 
  2 
 
(Choi et al., 2006; Wall et al., 2015). Despite the strong privacy information protections of HIPAA, over 
134 million patients’ information have been breached  since 2009 (HHS, 2016). These breaches endanger 
the confidentiality of patient records and result in dire organisational consequences, such as reputation 
damage, monetary penalties, and civil and criminal liabilities (Wall et al., 2015). To protect patients’ 
information from further breaches and to adhere to HIPAA without facing severe sanctions, healthcare 
organisations face major challenges in designing and implementing appropriate safeguards to mitigate 
information privacy threats (Choi et al., 2006). 
Information privacy refers to the degree to which individuals and organisations control when, 
how and to what extent information about them is released (Claerhout & DeMoor, 2005). Greenaway & 
Chan (2005) explain that organisational information privacy refers to how firms treat their customers’ 
personally identifiable information. Our focus is on organisational-level privacy violations and protection. 
Notably, Wall et al. (2015) outline four kinds of organisational privacy contexts, depending on whether 
organisational privacy procedures are internally generated (usually because of ethical and professional 
considerations) or externally generated (usually because of legal requirements, such as HIPAA) and on 
whether they are focused on protecting consumer privacy (such as HIPAA) or employees.  
Our privacy context is compliance to externally governed privacy regulations that protect 
healthcare consumers. The selection of the healthcare domain is not arbitrary. According to the privacy 
rights clearinghouse, a non-profit organization that keeps up-to-date information about data breaches 
across all industries within the U.S, the healthcare industry has the highest number of breaches (PRC, 
2016). This presents major challenges for healthcare organizations as they are trying to minimise these 
data breaches while not impeding the practice of medicine. The presence of increasing healthcare 
penalties for non-compliance and privacy operational demands (Croll, 2011), is adding further 
complexity. Accordingly, in our context, privacy compliance is defined on the organisation level (not the 
individual level) as the organisation complying with regulatory privacy rules to ensure the confidentiality 
of patients’ electronically protected health information (Wall et al., 2015). Previous researchers advocate 
for implementing privacy safeguards as part of organisational privacy management strategies. Privacy 
safeguards refer to technical protections, human defences, physical precautions and organisational 
processes to protect privacy (Parks et al., 2011b). However, these safeguards are only partially effective, 
because privacy breaches continue to occur (Culnan & Williams, 2009; Wall et al., 2015). Despite the 
acknowledged importance of privacy safeguard enactment on overall privacy compliance, the 
consequences of these enactments remain comparatively understudied (Belanger & Crossler, 2011; Smith 
et al., 2011). Notably, when referring to enacting privacy safeguards in this study, we focus on the act of 
implementing safeguards, not only decision to do so. This enactment, or implementation, can take many 
forms, including implementing the technical measures of encryption or passwords, adapting employment 
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sanctions for looking up records that do not pertain to one’s line of work and enforcing physical security 
through the use of badges to restrict access to certain areas. Importantly, most privacy and security 
studies, whether consumer- or employee-centric, focus primarily on internal rather than external 
compliance to privacy protection measures. As Wall et al. (2015) explain, studies focusing on externally 
governed privacy and security rules are primarily exploratory and descriptive in nature, probably because 
organisation-centric data collection is difficult in this research area (Dhillon & Moores, 2001; Walczuch 
& Steeghs, 2001; Milne & Culnan, 2002; Nord & McCubbins, 2006; Crossler et al., 2013). Moreover, 
much research in this area uses surveys or hypothetical scenarios (e.g., D'Arcy et al., 2009; Siponen & 
Vance, 2010), both of which may be difficult to apply to an organisation-level analysis of compliance to 
external privacy regulations. 
Moreover, to date, studies of organisational privacy compliance concentrate on the extent to 
which privacy threats can be alleviated through a combination of technical and human controls and the 
positive (and often intended) impacts of these privacy controls. However, this focus overlooks the 
unintended impacts of privacy safeguards, such as those that undermine medical processes or patient care. 
This is no minor oversight. Recent empirical studies raise concerns regarding the unintended 
consequences of privacy safeguards that impede employees’ needed access to information access and 
overall workflow (cf., Chen & Xu, 2013), as well as induce employees to engage in workarounds to 
bypass privacy procedures or features (cf., Murphy et al., 2014). Given the centrality of privacy 
compliance and the pivotal nature of engaging in proper processes in healthcare, it is imperative that 
privacy researchers in the healthcare domain identify both the intended and unintended consequences of 
enacting privacy safeguards and their subsequent effects on privacy compliance on an organisation level.  
The current study makes several contributions. First, it introduces a theoretical framework that 
explicates the process by which the individual privacy safeguards are evaluated and their intended and 
unintended impacts on the organisation’s privacy compliance are examined. Second, in response to the 
call by Belanger & Crossler (2011), we study the actual outcomes and implications of privacy safeguards 
in healthcare organisations. Specifically, we use a grounded theory approach to provide a rich lens to 
understand both intended and unintended consequences of privacy safeguard enactment and their 
implications for privacy compliance in medical practice. Third, this research contributes to the recent call 
for interdisciplinary research (Smith et al., 2011) by converging the research streams of both information 
systems (IS) and health informatics. Fourth, because Smith et al. (2011) show a lack of organisation-level 
privacy research in the extant literature, noting studies at the organisation level ‘are necessarily more 
complex and less conducive to ‘quick’ data collection techniques such as written and online surveys’ (p. 
1006), our research targets this under-researched level of analysis through a grounded theory approach, 
thus providing new theoretical insights on organisational privacy management.  
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Background 
This study’s literature review was based on defining three criteria: domain, sources and search 
strategy (Cooper, 1998). The domain is interdisciplinary and includes IS and health informatics. The 
literature on health informatics was reviewed, as it is contextually relevant. Our sources include the top 
five outlets identified by Lyytinen et al. (2007)for the IS field and we use Le Rouge & De Leo (2010) 
ranking to select our sources from the leading journals on health informatics. Importantly, our literature 
review focuses on two main themes that define our qualitative research: (1) privacy safeguards that are 
used in the healthcare industry and (2) the intended versus unintended consequences of enacting privacy 
safeguards in organisations. 
Privacy Safeguards in Healthcare 
There is a growing, yet still limited, body of research targeting organisational responses to 
privacy threats and issues (e.g., Greenaway & Chan, 2005; Culnan & Williams, 2009; Smith et al., 2011; 
Wall et al., 2015). One recent study suggests that organisations respond to the increasing list of privacy 
threats through a combination of technical and human controls, as well as processes (Parks et al., 2011a). 
In terms of technical safeguards, the health informatics literature is replete with research that proposes 
various technologies to address health information privacy threats, including the application of access 
control mechanisms to limit access to authorised users (Mohan & Yaacob, 2004; Blobel et al., 2006; 
Lovis et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2010), the use of anonymisation and pseudo-anonymisation to remove the 
identifiers from medical data (Quantin et al., 2000; Mohan & Yaacob, 2004; Aberdeen et al., 2010) and 
the adoption of encryption and cryptographic methods to make the data unreadable to anyone except 
those who hold the keys (Quantin et al., 2000).  
One of the biggest challenges in implementing the aforementioned technical safeguards is to 
develop systems or technologies that do not impede the operational activities of healthcare providers 
(Lovis et al., 2007). In the fields of IS and health informatics, the extant research studies the procedures 
that govern healthcare delivery processes and ensure information privacy. However, it has been more than 
two decades since Smith (1993) published findings based on a study of organisational privacy policies, 
which drew attention to such problems as a lack of policy and gaps between different policies and 
practices. Although organisations in the U.S. are more likely to enact privacy protection measures due to 
HIPAA compliance requirements (Peslak, 2006), the gap between organisationally desired privacy 
behaviours and actual privacy behaviours is still momentous (Croll, 2011; Wall et al., 2015).  
In term of human safeguards, several studies investigate the impact of training and education on 
increasing compliance (Mohan & Yaacob, 2004; Yeh & Chang, 2007; D'Arcy et al., 2009; Fernando & 
Dawson, 2009). However, the positive influence of these safeguards is mixed, especially in light of 
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research on employee misbehaviour and general compliance problems (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Siponen & 
Vance, 2010; Hu et al., 2011; Hsu et al., 2015; Lowry & Moody, 2015; Lowry et al., 2015).  
The Consequences of Enacting Privacy Safeguards 
Much of the literature on information privacy rests on the assumption that the enactment of 
privacy safeguards and mechanisms leads to better protected information and to better compliance (see 
Table 1), both of which are intended consequences. However, the enactment of privacy safeguards can 
bring some unintended consequences as well. We posit in our study that there may often be an imbalance 
between these intended and unintended consequences. 
Table 1 Mapping the Consequences of Enacting Privacy Safeguards 
 
 
Intended Consequences Unintended Consequences 
Po
sit
iv
e 
(Quantin et al., 2000; Ohno-Machado et al., 
2004; Ravera et al., 2004; Gritzalis et al., 
2005; Blobel et al., 2006; Boyd et al., 2007; 
Choe & Yoo, 2008; Kantarcioglu et al., 2008; 
Lee & Lee, 2008; Blanquer et al., 2009; 
Aberdeen et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2010; 
Croll, 2011; Haas et al., 2011; Canim et al., 
2012; Li et al., 2014) 
n/a 
N
eg
at
iv
e 
(Ohno-Machado et al., 2004; Kantarcioglu et 
al., 2008; Canim et al., 2012) 
(Ash et al., 2004; Coiera & Clarke, 
2004; Choi et al., 2006; Posey et al., 
2011; Lowry & Moody, 2015; 
Lowry et al., 2015) 
 
In the literature, unintended consequences refer to the unforeseen or unpredicted results of a 
specific action (Campbell et al., 2006). Organisational theorists study the impacts of unintended 
consequences in the domains of economic performance (Lal, 2001), project management (Brown, 2000) 
and organisational decision-making (Magasin & Gehlen, 1999). Recently, in the IS policy compliance 
literature, unintended consequences include negative employee reactions to policies, such as pushing 
back, doing the opposite of what is required, workarounds, malicious compliance and anger (Posey et al., 
2011; Lowry & Moody, 2015; Lowry et al., 2015). This literature indicates that such unintended 
consequences can occur because of employees’ perceived threats to freedom, unfairness or privacy 
invasion. 
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The discussion of unintended consequences is relatively new in the privacy management 
literature. However, in the IS field, unintended consequences originated from the diffusion of innovations 
(DOI) theory (Rogers, 1998), which posits that the consequences of adopting innovations can be intended 
or unintended and desirable or undesirable. Although our research focuses on the unintended negative 
consequences of organisational privacy safeguards in the healthcare domain, prior studies on DOI identify 
various unintended desirable and beneficial consequences of innovation adoption (Ash et al., 2004). 
Campbell et al. (2006) point out that ‘unintended consequences are not uniformly errors or mistakes: they 
are simply surprises that can span a spectrum from lucky to unfortunate’ (p. 548).  
In health informatics, many studies recognise the importance of the unintended consequences of 
adopting healthcare information technologies (HIT). For instance, both Ash et al. (2004) and Campbell et 
al. (2006) highlight the importance of the unexpected adverse consequences surrounding the 
implementation and maintenance of computerised provider order entry systems. Similarly, Harrison et al. 
(2007) analyse the emergent and recursive processes in HIT implementation and their unintended 
consequences. Collectively, these studies lead to a general consensus that introducing and implementing 
HIT is likely to incur a range of unanticipated adverse consequences, including higher clinician 
workloads, interrupted workflow, untoward changes in communications and practices, negative emotional 
responses, error generation and unexpected changes in power structures (Campbell et al., 2006).  
Given the recognised importance of unintended adverse consequences in both IS and health 
informatics, it is somewhat surprising to find limited studies on the unintended adverse consequences of 
privacy safeguards. One of the few exceptions is the study by Choi et al. (2006), which suggests that 
before the enactment of HIPAA, secure-lock doors remained open and passwords were shared to increase 
ease and efficiency. Work practices have changed after HIPAA to locking doors and limiting computer 
access to avoid regulatory incompliance and/or penalties. Another example of how implementing privacy 
safeguards triggers workflow disruptions is documented by Coiera & Clarke (2004), who show that 
managing patients’ e-consent privacy preferences may impede clinicians’ workflows. Failure to address 
these workflows’ disruptions could potentially lead employees to embrace workarounds to bypass the 
features that make accomplishing their work difficult (Ash et al., 2004).  
In summary, the privacy literature identifies various types of information privacy safeguards; that 
is, the mechanisms by which organisations respond to privacy threats and achieve compliance. Although 
unintended consequences are highlighted as an important issue within privacy management in the 
healthcare domain, little empirical research explicitly examines them in relation to privacy safeguards, or 
the struggles that organisation may face in balancing intended and unintended consequences. This 
research is designed to fill in the gap in the literature by exploring and describing how privacy safeguards 
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result in both intended and unintended consequences and to examine their effects on organisational 
privacy compliance.  
Research Method 
We adopt a qualitative research method in this study to answer our research question on the 
outcomes of enacting privacy safeguards. Specifically, we use a qualitative research approach based on 
grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Grounded theory aims to develop 
inductive theory from data through incremental and systematic progression in knowledge, deriving 
conceptual deduction and hypotheses (Urquhart et al., 2010). Furthermore, the grounded theory method is 
particularly appropriate for studies of dynamic environments (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), such as healthcare. 
It offers a rigorous approach that assists in understanding organisational privacy safeguards at the 
organisation level through testable theories tightly connected to data and context (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Data Collection 
After clearance by the institutional review board, informants were contacted to participate in this 
study. Informants from 21 U.S. hospitals as well as other healthcare organisations (consulting and 
healthcare research firms, the government and professional healthcare organisations) agreed to participate 
in this study, which is part of a larger project. Data were gathered through semi-structured interviews with 
30 consenting informants who had expert knowledge in privacy practices and were holding key positions 
in hospitals, such as chief executive officer, chief information officer, chief privacy officer, chief medical 
information officer, information technology director and privacy officer. Appendix A summarises the 
informants’ titles and types of organisations. Among hospitals, the study distinguishes between small, 
medium and large hospitals based on the number of beds. The American Hospital Association classifies 
hospitals with 100 or fewer beds as small (AHA, 2016), 500 or more beds as large (Kaunitz et al., 1984) 
and between 101 and 499 beds as medium. Interviews lasted between 40 and 90 minutes and were carried 
out by the first author between Fall 2010 and Spring 2012. The interviews explored the types of 
safeguards being used by healthcare organisations to mitigate privacy threats and their impacts on 
healthcare activities and practices. Our interview questionnaire evolved during the process of conducting 
this research. When we started identifying themes, we developed probe questions to explain differences in 
the informants’ privacy conceptualisations. These probe questions became more specific as we advanced 
in our data analysis. Details about the interview items are provided in Appendixes B and C. 
In grounded theory, sampling is driven by conceptual emergence and limited by theoretical 
saturation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Consequently, the selection of data sources is neither a random 
selection nor totally a priori. For example, we decided a priori that a combination of different hospital 
sizes was most appropriate for this study; however, pursuing a particular hospital size for further analysis 
depended on the emergent themes. Strauss & Corbin (1998) note that researchers must be flexible to 
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handle what arises during data collection and analysis. In this study, theoretical sampling is evident 
through the following statements: 
• Interviewing was initiated with informants from hospitals. However, after initial data analysis, this 
target was revisited to include other healthcare organisations and entities (e.g. the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services, healthcare professional associations, healthcare IT providers and 
healthcare privacy consultants).  
• The interview questions were also revisited after the analysis of the first interviews, to include more 
specific questions about the operational impacts of implementing privacy safeguards. This is 
consistent with Strauss and Corbin’s approach to theoretical sampling, where the researcher 
‘adjusts the interviews and observations on the basis of emergent and relevant concepts’ (1998, p. 
207). 
Although we had difficulty obtaining informants because of the critical sensitivity of privacy and 
security topics (Crossler et al., 2013), as well as the scheduling challenges of healthcare executives, we 
managed to secure interviews with 30 informants. Our success was due to our involvement and 
membership with the healthcare information and management systems society (HIMSS), the Penn State 
center for integrated healthcare delivery systems (CIHDS), and finally to using the snowball technique 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985) where we were able to identify the next informant based on the last informant’s 
connections. We conducted data collection and analysis until the point of saturation, when we reached 
redundancy in the data and found no new concepts (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  
Data Analysis 
In this section, we provide an overview of the steps undertaken using the grounded theory 
approach, as depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Grounded Theory Analysis Process  
 
Data 
Collection
Emergent 
Theoretical 
Model
Analysis Findings
Procedure: 
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coding
- Theme   
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Results:
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Results:
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framework
Procedure: 
- Semi-
structured 
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- Workshops
- Documents
Results:
-Transcripts
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All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. The transcribed interviews were 
imported into a computer on which the qualitative data analysis software tool NVivo (v.9) was installed. 
Notably, NVivo does not automatically code transcribed interviews but is used to organise the different 
codes and categories that are identified during the first- and second-order analyses. NVivo supports 
different stages of analysis, including defining concepts within themes, called nodes, and providing data 
analysis capabilities for searching, grouping and relating these nodes. We coded the interviews in several 
steps. First, we used open coding techniques to inductively identify preliminary categories, with no a 
priori coding or categorisation. The next step used was axial coding, which helped to develop the 
categories into themes (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Finally, we implemented selective coding, where we 
integrated the categories into a coherent theoretical framework. During the process of data collection and 
analysis, we reviewed the literature from both the IS and health informatics communities to identify the 
potential contributions of our findings to the privacy literature in the healthcare domain.  
During the coding process, every piece of data was contrasted against other pieces through 
constant comparison to ensure that the appropriate codes were applied to informants’ views. Having 
embraced the constant comparative method, we continued looking for information until the categories 
were saturated and no additional data were found. The constant comparative method has been a key 
concept in the development and understanding of grounded theory (Glaser, 2001). According to Glaser & 
Strauss (1967, pp. 113-114), the constant comparative method facilitates the generation of complex 
“theories of process, sequence, and change pertaining to organisations, positions, and social interaction 
[that] correspond closely to the data since the constant comparison force the analyst to consider much 
diversity in the data.”  Constant comparisons determine the relevance to the emergent theory or the 
assumptions made by the emergent theory.  
. 
Evaluative and Trustworthiness Criteria 
The evaluation of every research poses the question of the appropriate criteria to be used for 
making judgments. Positivist researchers employ the criteria of internal validity, external validity, 
reliability and objectivity. These criteria are not appropriate for interpretive studies. We used two 
approaches for judging interpretive research: (1) ensuring trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) and (2) 
ensuring the adequacy of the research process and its empirical grounding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; 
Corbin & Strauss, 2008). These approaches are explained next and applied to the theoretical framework 
(See Appendix F and G).  
Ensuring Trustworthiness: 
The aim of trustworthiness is to support the assumption that a study’s findings are ‘worth paying 
attention to’ (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 290). Lincoln & Guba (1985) offer a set of four trustworthiness 
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criteria appropriate for interpretive research that are analogous to positivist research: credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability. To address credibility, we used multiple methods and 
sources to ensure triangulation of the findings, such as single interviews, group interviews and data 
collection from different sources (e.g. hospitals and government administrators, consultants and IT 
designers). Triangulation was also achieved by using supplemental information gathered during privacy 
and/or healthcare workshops and roundtables attended by the authors, along with the associated 
documentation.1 Moreover, the first author has several years of industry experience in healthcare IT, in 
addition to being an active member of a healthcare research centre (Penn State CHIDS) and a national 
healthcare professional association (HIMSS). To ensure transferability, we provide a detailed first-order 
analysis of the phenomenon and context, which should provide enough background for readers to judge 
the plausibility of the findings and their applicability beyond the scope of this project (Van Maanen & 
Schein, 1979). We conducted an inquiry audit rather an inter-rater reliability, because interpretive 
research assumes that each researcher will have a unique interpretation of the findings (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985). An inquiry audit was performed by one professor of organisational behaviour and one senior 
graduate student (trained in qualitative research) to examine and assess the process of inquiry and review 
the interview transcripts, coding sheets and data analysis. Finally, to measure how the findings were 
supported by the data collected; we shared the study with three professors, two graduate students and two 
healthcare professionals to solicit critical feedback. The consensus suggests that this research analysis and 
theoretical model accurately reflect the data. 
Ensuring the Adequacy of the Research Process and the Empirical Grounding:  
Corbin & Strauss (2008) identify several criteria for evaluating an interpretive research. The 
empirical grounding includes evaluating eight criteria including assessing if the concepts used in the 
research are grounded in the data, if there is linkage between concepts, insights and if the theoretical 
framework is able to withstand future testing and research, every criterion is evaluated and documented in 
appendix F. The adequacy of the research process includes seven criteria pertaining to the selection of the 
original sample, the categories that emerged, how did theoretical formulations guide some of the data 
collections, and how and why was the core category selected?  All seven criteria and their evaluation are 
documented in detail in appendix G,  
Findings 
                                                     
1 There were a total of four events: The first event was a privacy and security workshop in Florida where 
the attendees included healthcare consultants, faculty and healthcare government representatives. The second event 
also took place in Florida in the form of a privacy roundtable. The attendees included chief privacy officers, chief 
information officers, lawyers and consultants. The third event was a healthcare workshop that took place in 
Pennsylvania with faculty, EHR developers and hospital administrators. The fourth event was a healthcare workshop 
in the District of Columbia where the attendees were faculty and healthcare government representatives. 
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Using a grounded theory approach, we present the concepts and categories that emerged from 
the iterative process of data gathering and analysis (Figure 2). The findings are presented by 
interweaving the first order codes along with the second order themes to provide an overarching 
structure through a thick description of the data (Kreiner et al., 2006).  
Intended Desirable Consequences 
We found that the intended desirable consequences include controlled access, the deterrence 
effect and tracking mechanisms. These categories and representative data for each category are 
presented in Appendix E.  
Controlled access: The creation of technical privacy safeguards, such as role-based access 
control (RBAC) mechanisms, allowed for better control over who could access the system. Hence, 
filtering out users who have no business looking at patient information was a positive consequence of 
privacy safeguards—each employee is granted access based on their need to know, which is defined by 
their role within the organisation. As one healthcare executive commented: 
We have a role-based access, and that’s very important, because you don’t want to give 
employees any more access than what they need . . . So, basically, what we do is we look at the 
information system and the duties of the employee and we base their access on that. 
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Figure 2. Emergent Concepts, Themes and Dimensions 
 
Consequently, hospitals that enact privacy safeguards such as access control within their systems have 
better outcomes regarding who is accessing the data and for what purpose.  
Deterrence effect: Informants emphasised the ability of a deterrence approach to create an 
environment of fear when rules are not followed. This fear was perceived as a positive impact, because it 
sets an example and deters other employees from inappropriately handling patient information. A chief 
privacy officer of a large hospital used an analogy to refer to how his organisation benefits from a 
deterrence approach: 
It is sort of user grisly analogy. Back in medieval England when they chopped people’s heads off, 
they would put [that] head on a pike, and they stick it on the London Bridge, and the idea was 
that it would allow you to see who had their head chopped off. It was a very public hanging. And 
so, it’s the same thing here, we can’t necessarily say who we fire, but you hope the word gets out, 
you hope the employee that gets fired almost says, I can’t believe they fired me for looking at that. 
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Well okay fine, I want you to tell your co-workers, because I want your co-workers to say, I am 
not going to do this again because I don’t want to have the same thing happen to me, or I don’t 
want to be suspended. 
Instating fear and punishment for not protecting organisational data is perceived as an important and 
desirable consequence of enacting privacy safeguards, as it makes a clear statement of the expectations 
and consequences, which prevents misjudgements. A similar positive influence of fear was recently 
shown empirically in a study on motivating users to protect organisational security assets (Boss et al., 
2015). 
Tracking mechanisms: In addition to controlled access, healthcare executives believed that the 
ability to track who accesses specific records and when they were accessed was a major positive outcome 
of privacy safeguard enactment. One chief medical information officer stated: 
One of the nice things about EHRs [electronic health records] is when somebody signs in, you 
know who signed in and what time where they are at [a record] . . . We have tracking 
mechanisms to be able to determine if I log into a chart and I go look at a nurse I work with it. 
Well, the system really knows who I am looking at here. So, if I am taking care of her [the nurse] 
as a patient in the emergency department. That would be clinically appropriate. If I have never 
seen her as a physician – patient relationship and I am looking at her chart, well, that is 
completely inappropriate. 
This ability to perform audits and investigate who accessed the system is viewed as an intended and 
desirable consequences, deterring access that is not authorised. 
Expected Adverse Consequences 
Healthcare executives also expected some negative outcomes of privacy efforts. These outcomes 
resulted in user resistance, data disclosures and secondary use. Appendix E presents these categories and 
representative data for each category. 
User resistance: The creation of new privacy safeguards created some resistance and complaints 
from users. Integrating privacy and security mechanisms in healthcare systems, which restrict clinicians’ 
access to patient information, is challenging. As stated by one chief privacy officer: 
The dilemma is to give the clinicians the most important information that they can with the least 
amount of resistance. 
 
This resistance emerged in instances in which instating passwords that are too complex and/or 
need to be changed frequently, thus making it hard for users to remember and adhere to the requirements. 
This challenge was described by one chief of information security officer: 
If the security is too hard, people wouldn’t do it. If it is beyond their work flow, they won’t do 
it…I tell people all the time that security flies in the face of convenience; that’s just the way it 
always is… so, a lot of push-back or complaints. 
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Data disclosures and secondary use: Informants emphasised their concern over patient 
information when it is not used for direct treatment. This concern was perceived as a negative impact 
because the hospital no longer has direct control over the data when shared with other entities for 
purposes of payment, coding, medical research or other. One a healthcare executive commented: 
How do you secure information that’s being used for secondary purposes for research, for 
research, for quality, for billing and [for] coding? 
Another healthcare executive stated: 
There are many times when a clerical person will hit the wrong number on the fax machine and 
fax a lab result for a patient to a Sheetz store [convenience store]… this happens all the time. 
Unintended Desirable Consequences 
Healthcare executives reported several positive outcomes of privacy efforts that were not initially 
intended. These privacy efforts yielded benefits such as standardisation of work processes and better 
accountability. Appendix E presents these categories and the representative data for each category. 
Standardisation of work processes: The creation of privacy policies prompted organisations to be 
more aware of their physical operational surroundings and the visual setup of computers. For instance, in 
certain departments where patients are present, extra initiatives were taken to protect patient information, 
such as monitor screen protectors to make devices impossible to read at angles other than that of the user. 
One informant stated: 
We must make sure that it is [patient information] handled appropriately … provide basic stuff of 
making sure people close curtains, close doors, they position their computers and equipment so 
that people can’t read or see the information. 
Another desirable and unintended consequence regarding work processes was related to the use 
of online social media (ONS). Employees sometimes make ONS posts about patients or about the hospital 
not thinking about potential privacy breaches. These situations are motivating hospitals to have 
procedures in place to standardise online posts. One privacy officer explained:  
Here’ is how we get in trouble on Facebook and how a lot of guys get in trouble. I think a lot of 
the marketing teams like using Facebook for marketing. So, people get in there and say some 
good things without asking, but then you could also say bad things about a manager or certain 
things going on. That’s when our privacy comes in … you want to say something bad about [our 
hospital], what do you do then? There has to be some procedures and protocols around that. 
Accountability: Healthcare executives also reported individual and organisational behaviours that 
showed better accountability in protecting patient information. Best practices toward patient data even if 
the law/regulation is not established and voluntary compliance were among the behaviours described. 
Accountability has long been a powerful deterrent against undesired behaviours and refers to ‘the implicit 
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or explicit pressure to justify one’s beliefs and actions to others’ (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tadmor & 
Tetlock, 2009, p. 8). Recent IS policy compliance research shows the powerful, positive organisation 
effects of fostering accountability in employees through accountability theory (Vance et al., 2013, 2015). 
Vance et al. (2015) explain how accountability works to increase organisational policy compliance, as 
follows: 
Accountability theory explains how the perceived need to justify one’s behaviours to another 
party causes one to consider and feel accountable for the process by which decisions and 
judgments have been reached. In turn, this perceived need to account for a decision-making 
process and outcome increases the likelihood that one will think deeply and systematically about 
one’s procedural behaviours (p. 347). 
Focusing on doing the right thing through best practices makes the environment much more 
accountable at protecting patient information rather than only focusing on meeting the regulatory 
requirements. In this regard, one chief privacy officer stated: 
I do think that there are a number of motivating factors. One of them is the right thing to do and 
that is the right attitude, and that would get you a lot further than going off checking off check 
boxes and say we did this, we did this, we are done, because you are never really done, even if 
you followed all the rules. You have those who do a lot of compliance very voluntarily and that is 
why I am only half joking when I said that those laws are meant to address those who are not 
willing to bring themselves into high standards and compliance; that’s why we have them. Think 
about it, most people who work in a bank don’t embezzle money, but you have rules against that 
because you have few bad actors, and that is the same here. 
You just try to set that base line high enough to make sure that the information is secure. So, that 
is the purpose of the regulation and some of the certification requirements it to make sure that 
you have a fairly high baseline to make sure that the information is adequately protected, but we 
would encourage people to go beyond that and I don’t know how you dictate attitude. And if you 
are not going to do it, I think the party line is if you are not going to do it because you have the 
right attitude, then we will make you do it through regulation and enforcement.  
Several healthcare executives noted their voluntary compliance beyond compliance with 
regulatory mandates:  
It is not like we did not care about information before [HIPAA] and now all of the sudden the 
legislation makes you compliant with this. That is a poor assumption! We clearly value patient 
health information security at the highest level and have had for years …. For example, when we 
were building the EHRs eight years ago, before HITECH and even before HIPAA, all those 
considerations of who need to see what information, where is it secured, and where the displays 
for the screens are, were all inherent to what we are doing. Also, the policies and procedure 
associated with that. We actually have people who are hired to oversee those things in the 
institutions—patient privacy officers—so there are people who live and breathe this every day. 
When the HIPAA privacy rule came out, because it was a mandate, organisations did comply 
because they knew they needed to. However, I don’t think that’s the only thing, because most 
organisations that I’ve come in contact with either, because I’ve worked there or I know their 
privacy officers, they do compliance because it’s a good thing to do. 
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We like to see particularly security as being an essential element of an electronic system, and 
other people see it and add on. That is not the right perspective to have. When you have that 
perspective, then it flows to the bottom of piles of the things that you are doing. So, yes, now we 
have this wonderful electronic system, but we don’t have the money to put the adequate security 
on it. While in reality, you have to. It is part of the price of doing business.  
  
Unintended Adverse Consequences 
Although it is natural to make the inference that creating technical and human privacy safeguards 
leads to better organisational compliance and fewer privacy breaches, our analysis shows some 
unexpected results. Several executives reported unintended and undesirable impacts of privacy safeguard 
enactment. This includes information unavailability, workflow disruptions, usability issues and 
operational feasibility issues. Appendix D summarises the categories of unintended consequences and the 
representative data for each category. 
Information unavailability: Notably, a question about the influence of privacy safeguards on the 
availability of information was not explicitly asked during the interviews. Rather, the informants 
themselves introduced this challenge while explaining the impacts of privacy safeguard enactment. This 
challenge was described by one chief information security officer as having two directives:  
We don’t want to keep information out of the hands of people who need it. So, if we develop 
something that is too stringent … they can’t do their jobs the right way. 
Several healthcare leaders discussed the ways in which implementing privacy safeguards 
influenced the availability or accessibility of patient information. Lacking access to the information 
needed to perform his or her job is a big hurdle for any healthcare professional. For example, doctors need 
to see a patient’s medications list or their lab tests but may not need to see a progress note on a psychiatric 
condition or a psychotherapy note. The desire to balance the implementation of privacy programs and 
healthcare delivery appeared to have created serious issues for clinicians trying to provide care for their 
patients, which opened up doors for potential unauthorised access and impacted privacy compliance. As 
noted by one of the healthcare executives:  
The biggest challenge with respect to privacy and healthcare, in my mind, is this notion that you 
have to err on the side of providing additional information access. You can’t afford to put a 
barrier in front of a physician or a clinician when they need to have access to the information. So, 
you have to sometimes err on providing broader access than you might think you need, because 
you don’t necessarily know what you need about those people who need to have access to. That 
does raise challenges, because that then allows those individuals [to access] information that 
they don’t need to see. 
Healthcare professionals, such as doctors and nurses, are increasingly dependent on the 
availability and accuracy of patient information to provide adequate treatment and make other healthcare-
related decisions. Information availability is very important in healthcare, where patient information is 
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often needed on a continual basis. Our results highlight the dilemma of ensuring availability and access to 
patient information for authorised healthcare providers without breaching the confidentiality of medical 
information. If the information needed by healthcare professionals to reach critical clinical decisions were 
unavailable due to tight access controls, patients may be incorrectly treated. Therefore, the unavailability 
of information may have dire consequences for the quality of patient care. 
Workflow disruptions: As part of the interview protocol (Appendix A), the first author explored 
the effects of privacy and security safeguards on healthcare workflows. Comments about workflow 
disruption issues came up during the semi-structured interviews. The data analysis shows that these 
workflow disruptions were reflected through conflicts and push-back from employees as noted by one 
informant:  
Do you want me not to administer that medication because everything didn’t line up in the 
security behind the scenes? 
The implementation of certain privacy technologies resulted in conflicts and push-back. For 
example, timeout features are supposed to log off employees whose sessions are inactive to prevent 
unauthorised access by other employees. Although, hypothetically, this feature is an effective privacy 
initiative, it is not always positively received by certain healthcare professionals, especially doctors in 
emergency departments. One privacy leader stated: 
Once I log in, I don’t want the system to log me out automatically. I don’t like it and timeout 
features. There’s timeout in all our systems. This is something we have to work around. 
Healthcare organisations tend to consider these impacts to avoid push-back and workarounds:  
We try to take that into account, the workflow issues, when you are looking at a policy because 
there is no sense in establishing a policy that people will not adhere to. 
Although mitigation tools were implemented to bring the hospitals into compliance, in some 
cases, they ended up negatively impacting the hospitals’ adherence to regulations. In cases of workflow 
disruptions issues, employees found ways around these mitigation tools to accomplish their duties. This 
disruption was illustrated by the nurses’ workflows that one of the study informants shared:  
Forty percent of the work that a nurse does is to administer medication; 40% of her day, she’s 
looking for pills and administering them. . . she is logging in and waiting, waiting, waiting and 
waiting. That is a problem; she is not going to get her job done. It’s hard enough to do the 
charting, administering medicine without the waiting, waiting and waiting. So, what most 
hospitals do is they have these computers-on-wheels, and they wheel [such a computer] into the 
patient’s room, and they leave it logged on, and they administer the medicine, and they wheel it 
out, and they leave it logged on, and then they go into the next room and then they leave it logged 
on. But when they go back to the medicine room, it’s logged on, and that’s a security risk. 
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Our results suggest that, in the pursuit of privacy compliance, organisations implement processes 
that may change their employees’ operational workflows. These changes may involve encrypting network 
transmission, pulling staff out for training or instating timeout features. As a result, users may not always 
positively react to implemented changes, especially when these changes disrupt their work routines.  
Usability issues: Usability has long been defined as the degree of efficiency, ease and 
effectiveness of use, and this concept has been applied to a broad range of users, tasks, tools and 
environments (Kushniruk, 2002; Kushniruk & Patel, 2004; Lowry et al., 2006; Lowry et al., 2013). 
Usability is particularly crucial to medical systems (Kushniruk, 2002; Kushniruk & Patel, 2004). With the 
design and implementation of privacy protective technologies, usability has become an extremely 
important, albeit poorly understood, element of privacy. The end results of poor usability are user 
dissatisfaction and unusable systems (Johnson et al., 2005). In the healthcare industry, understanding the 
interplay between usability and privacy is essential because various privacy-enhancing technologies have 
been introduced to control access to medical facilities and protect the confidentiality of patient 
information.  
The usability challenges we found during data analysis include current applications or systems of 
EHRs. The challenges arose from dealing with inherent difficulties associated with using certain 
applications. Over the course of this study, healthcare executives explained that they had to take into 
consideration the usability of the privacy safeguards they had implemented: 
It comes from EHRs’ usability and access to information. I mean, in certain scenarios, I would 
like to walk in with a purely clinician’s hat on. I like to walk into a room and see the patient’s 
information, talk with that patient and provide the care. But, somehow, I have to be 
acknowledged as being allowed to see that information. So, that is one of the conflicts. I have to 
log in or else I have to use an RFID tag or swipe something to get into that record. 
 If a new privacy or security feature is hard to use or difficult to navigate, users will abandon it, as 
was clearly stated by an informant:  
If it is not usable to them, they won’t use it. And the things that are very usable to them, they are 
used to them, they can; I’ve seen this all the time. 
Therefore, not addressing usability issues causes employees not to use privacy protocols or to find ways 
around them to accomplish their tasks, which could negatively impact the organisational privacy 
compliance. 
Operational feasibility issues: Many of the informants commented on the operational feasibility 
of the privacy safeguards implemented in their hospitals, including resources, time and efficiency. As 
stated by one of the informants: 
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So, it does have an impact on resources and operation. You’re going to get to a point where 
people are going to have to have staff in place to just deal with that one situation, just to keep up 
with what they’re going to have to do to make sure they protect themselves. It’s got to be costing 
us money or it’s got to be costing us efficiency. 
For example, implementing automated analytics that trigger alerts whenever a doctor accesses a 
patient’s record that has the same last name as the doctor’s, can involve so many people and processes 
that it could negatively influence the overall performance of healthcare delivery. Regarding healthcare 
regulations, hospitals face major operational issues due to how healthcare policies are crafted. The 
challenges that healthcare leaders face regarding operational feasibility are weighed against the patients’ 
best interests and, therefore, they impact privacy compliance. One privacy compliance officer stated: 
‘We have lots of policies but we can’t meet the regulations in the strictest letter of the law and 
offer clinicians their ability to practice in an efficient cost effective manner.’ 
 
In summary, operational feasibility is an important factor for the deployment of new privacy 
safeguards in medical practices. Implementing privacy safeguards includes putting into place formal 
privacy education and training programs, as well as monitoring compliance through the use of technology 
and human processes. Our data showed unintended adverse consequences of the enactment of privacy 
safeguards on operational feasibility, resulting in performance degradation.  
The Imbalance Challenge 
Throughout this research project, healthcare leaders stated on numerous occasions that privacy 
threats do not end with the implementation of controls and safeguards. They also reported that both 
intended consequences and unintended consequences may occur during the enactment of privacy 
safeguards. Although intended consequences—both desirable and undesirable—are expected and 
accounted for, it is the emergence of unintended consequence, especially adverse consequences, which 
causes imbalance between maintaining patient privacy and not inhibiting workflows. The imbalance 
challenge is an analytical construct that was created to make sense of what organisations reported as the 
results of enacting information privacy safeguards. The imbalance challenge, which is the result of 
unintended consequences outweighing intended consequences of privacy safeguard enactment, outlines 
the organisations’ struggles in maintaining patient privacy without inhibiting business processes. 
Although no mathematical formula was presented or derived, the privacy leaders pointed specifically to 
adverse unintended consequences as the main culprit for this imbalance.  
According to privacy leaders, an imbalance challenge occurs when the unintended consequences 
of enacting privacy safeguards outweigh the intended ones. A chief information officer stated: 
Cost and safety pretty much drive a good portion of what we do and I am not talking about the 
cost of [technology] …. I am talking about the cost of not getting the results to the patient fast 
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enough. I am talking about the cost of delivering the wrong medication dose … the technology 
piece of it is expensive, but it is not nearly as expensive as the down side of not doing it. 
The same chief information officer continued:  
My dilemma is stability versus intricacy like meeting the requirements. The requirements are such 
that I can’t always offer a stable system, but if I am a patient and I just had hip surgery and I am 
in excruciating pain and I need pain meds, they [patients] really don’t care that my seven 
application solution works or not, they just want the pain medication. So, there is the dilemma, 
stability offering enough flexibility and don’t let yourself get caught but giving out too much 
information.  
One privacy officer illustrated this imbalance challenge by stating: 
One of the challenges with my area is when we try to secure the information but yet our 
healthcare providers need quick access to it. So there’s always kind of a fine line there. 
 
Privacy leaders uniformly emphasised the need for better understanding and handling of 
conflicting challenges. Hence, a thorough understanding of these factors and their influence on business 
practices is fundamental for explaining and addressing the imbalance challenge. The imbalance challenge 
is of pronounced concern to healthcare privacy leaders as illustrated by a chief privacy officer: 
The federal law is toying with the idea of making sure that data at rest is encrypted. Not the 
movement of the data. In other words, if one of my hard drives would be encrypted and if 
somebody needs to get data unencrypted and pass it forward, that’s going to be almost 
impossible to put in place. This is because none of the environments, none of the vendors, have 
built their systems that way. 
Discussion of the Emergent Theoretical Framework  
This section presents the emergent theoretical framework, the unintended consequences of 
privacy safeguard enactment (UCPSE framework), illustrating the intended and unintended consequences, 
the emergence of workarounds implications and the impacts on the organisation’s privacy compliance 
(Figure 3). The model describes a process that includes the following categories: the enactment of privacy 
safeguards, intended (desirable and adverse) and unintended (desirable and adverse) consequences of 
implementing privacy safeguards, the imbalance challenge, workarounds and organisational privacy 
compliance. Close analysis of the data revealed interrelations among these categories and allowed for 
their integration into a theoretical framework (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). These major categories are found 
within both IS and health informatics communities, yet they are seldom interconnected in the literature. 
We present a theoretical framework that unifies these concepts and thereby contributes to the explanation 
of the consequences of privacy safeguard enactment, the causes of the workarounds and the impacts on 
organisational privacy compliance. This section also compares the categories and relationships of the 
theoretical framework with those from related literature (Eisenhardt, 1989). The interpretations suggest 
that the process diverges in two paths when unintended consequences outweigh intended consequences. 
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Enacting and Evaluating Privacy Safeguards 
Organisations enact privacy safeguards to mitigate information privacy threats and ensure legal 
compliance. However, much of the organisational research on privacy safeguards ignores a 
comprehensive view of reality: it tends to focus on intended consequences but overlooks unintended 
adverse consequences. Therefore, in this study, we propose an emergent theoretical framework that 
includes a more realistic range of intended and unintended consequences that can lead to the imbalance 
challenge. This framework requires that the following four quadrants of potential consequences of 
safeguards be considered: (1) intended consequences that are desirable, (2) expected consequences that 
are undesirable, (3) unintended consequence that are desirable and (4) unintended consequences that are 
undesirable. Figure 4, visually portrays these quadrants with actual examples from our data collection. 
Evaluating Whether an Imbalance Challenge Exists 
Once these consequences are explored, one can better assess whether an imbalance challenge is 
likely to happen by examining the unintended consequences and more specifically the undesirable 
consequences. These types of undesirable consequences tend to negatively shift the organisations’ desired 
balance. For example, we expect the unavailability of information needed to treat a patient to create an 
imbalance challenge between protecting patient information and treating patients. Similarly, disruptions 
in workflow, usability and operational issues impede healthcare delivery. Ideally, the organisation 
minimises the negative impacts and enhances the positive ones, because healthcare organisations seek to 
achieve  
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Figure 3. The Unintended Consequences of Privacy Safeguard Enactment (UCPSE) Framework 
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both protection of patient information and regulatory compliance. In doing so, they implement privacy 
safeguards to minimise privacy breaches and abide by regulatory pressures. 
Our data analysis revealed that the enactment of information privacy protective safeguards 
influences healthcare workflows through intended and unintended consequences, thus creating the 
imbalance challenge. Achieving a balance between privacy and utility by maximally reducing unintended 
negative impacts is challenging because of the dynamic environment of healthcare delivery. The 
dynamics inherent in medical practices, such as scheduled and unscheduled patient visits, clinicians’ 
unscheduled shifts, dynamic collaborations among clinicians and workforce needed at unexpected times 
and locations, often conflict with privacy role-based access safeguards (Boxwala et al., 2011; Chen & Xu, 
2013) and, thus, make the imbalance challenge even more vital. The intended positive consequences of 
enacting privacy safeguards may function as a facilitator to privacy compliance, whereas the unintended 
adverse consequences may function as inhibitors.  
When relating the imbalance challenge to the literature, we applied the lens of balance theory to 
seek an explanation for the contradictory intended and unintended impacts and the imbalance challenge. 
According to Heider (1946) and Lewin (1951), balance theory is a structural arrangement between social 
actors and affective ties. If these arrangements create an imbalance (tension or strain), actors will take 
actions to reduce this imbalance. For example, as a result of discomfort in a relationship, an actor may 
take a detachment action. However, contrary to the balance theory’s expectation of detachment, our data 
indicated that once healthcare leaders become aware of unintended impacts, they work on resolving those 
adverse impacts rather than distancing themselves from them. In situations in which privacy safeguards 
impede healthcare delivery, healthcare leaders increase their involvement rather than reduce it. For 
example, when needed information was not available to clinicians, leaders reviewed the policies and a 
‘break-the-glass’ feature was created to allow clinicians to bypass the controls. Also, because of the 
- Standardisation of work 
processes 
- Better accountability 
 
 
- Information unavailability  
- Workflow disruptions  
- Usability issues  
- Operational feasibility 
 
- User resistance 
- Data disclosures and 
secondary use 
- Controlled access 
- Deterrence effect 
- Tracking mechanisms 
  24 
 
penalties associated with privacy breaches, organisations could not afford to avoid taking actions. Hence, 
balance theory is not the right theoretical lens to fully understand the imbalance challenge. 
Likewise, the opposing concepts of negative and positive impacts of the imbalance challenge led 
us to consider the privacy calculus theory in the privacy literature (e.g, Culnan & Bies, 2003). This 
theoretical framework has been applied at the individual level (e.g., Dinev & Hart, 2006; Xu et al., 2009; 
Keith et al., 2013) and provides insights that are worth taking into account at the organisation level. 
Privacy calculus considers two sets of opposing factors: inhibitors and facilitators to behavioural 
intentions, such as willingness to conduct online transactions or intentions to disclose information. An 
individual’s decision to transact online is based on the outcome of weighing both sets of factors: if the 
effects of the facilitating factors (e.g. perceived benefits, trust and control) are greater than those of 
inhibiting factors (e.g. privacy concerns and perceived risk), the individual is more likely to engage in a 
transaction. Although it is individuals who make the a priori decisions, the theoretical model of the 
imbalance challenge pertains to consequences of these decisions at the organisation level. Moreover, 
privacy calculus allows the individual to ‘calculate’ whether it is beneficial to engage in a transaction, 
whereas in the theoretical model of the imbalance challenge, organisations do not calculate but deal with 
the consequences in the form of the imbalance challenge. To reiterate, the imbalance challenge results 
from unintended negative impacts outweighing intended positive impacts. Hence, whereas the imbalance 
challenge does consider costs and benefits, it does not share the same lens or individual-level assumptions 
of privacy calculus. Hence, privacy calculus is not an accurate theoretical lens to fully understand the 
imbalance challenge. 
Bypassing Privacy Safeguards: Workarounds and Reactance 
Our findings suggest that the issues surrounding the organisational struggles to meet the ever-
increasing privacy constraints and to comply with regulatory requirements have become a central concern 
to healthcare leaders. Again, the imbalance challenge emerged as the key concept regarding these 
struggles. An unattended imbalance challenge can potentially be harmful to the organisation’s privacy 
compliance because, in many cases, employees use this imbalance to justify workarounds and negative 
reactance to privacy safeguards. These workarounds range from legitimate to not legitimate and finally 
illegitimate user reactions. A striking example of legitimate use of workarounds was provided by a chief 
privacy officer who stated that clinicians sometimes bypass privacy safeguards to do their jobs, which 
involves saving lives. He emphasised that he would rather explain to the Office of Civil Rights why one 
of the hospital’s employees inappropriately accessed information (e.g. used someone else’s log-in 
credentials) rather than having to explain to a family member that he could not save their loved one 
because of privacy safeguards. The concern surrounding such actions is that the same access that saves 
lives could also hinder privacy compliance. An illegitimate example of workarounds was provided by the 
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same chief privacy officer when he referred to the case of an Arizona congresswoman who was admitted 
to a hospital after being shot and how several employees lost their jobs for inappropriately looking up her 
medical records. Finally, less legitimate uses of workarounds included bypassing encryption or leaving 
computer unintended while logged on to save time. 
This study provides evidence, with support from the literature, that when unintended adverse 
impacts outweigh intended ones, healthcare professionals may see a need to improvise or workaround 
their workflows. For example, information unavailability can be circumvented by users borrowing 
passwords or smart cards to access records they are not authorised to access (France, 1998). They may 
also ignore required encryption mechanisms because of their impact on job performance. The potential 
harm resides in subsequent use of patient information (e.g. copying and transmitting) under different 
users’ log-ins. Extant health informatics literature describes workarounds as clever alternative methods 
developed by users to accomplish what the system does not easily allow them to do (Ash et al., 2004). 
Similarly, Morath & Turnbull (2005) define workarounds as ‘work patterns an individual or a group of 
individuals create to accomplish a crucial work goal within a system of dysfunctional work processes that 
prohibits the accomplishment of that goal or makes it difficult’ (p. 52). Workarounds are recognised in 
both IS and health informatics literature (Pollock, 2005); however, few studies seek to theoretically 
explain this concept (Halbesleben et al., 2008), especially with regard to information privacy.  
Aside from workarounds, a dangerous unintended consequence organisations may face in a 
compliance context is negative employee reactance. Recently, in the IS policy compliance literature, this 
is addressed in terms of negative employee reactance to policies, including pushing back, doing the 
opposite of what is required, workarounds, malicious compliance and anger (Posey et al., 2011; Lowry & 
Moody, 2015; Lowry et al., 2015). This literature indicates that these unintended consequences occur 
because of employees’ perceived threats to freedom, perceived unfairness or perceived privacy invasion 
of the employee. An illustrative example was provided by a chief information officer who stated that 
nurses within his hospital exhibited reactance towards some of their computer privacy policies by doing 
the opposite of what is mandated. In fact, 40% of a nurse’s work is to administer medication in timely 
manner to different patients. However, having to log in and log out between patients was getting in the 
way of delivering care. As a reaction, several nurses were purposely leaving their computers logged on, 
simply wheeling the machine between rooms or while seeking medication for their patients.  
Assessing the Impacts on Organisational Privacy Compliance 
In using grounded theory, Urquhart et al. (2010) emphasise leveraging a systematic and iterative 
approach to theory conceptualisation. Embracing this approach enabled us to further analyse the 
unintended adverse consequences. We pursued a theoretical sampling in an attempt to increase our 
knowledge of the intended and unintended consequences of privacy safeguard enactment, their impacts on 
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business practices and their implications for privacy compliance. Further analysis allowed us to 
distinguish between: (1) organisations where leaders were not aware of the unintended negative impacts 
and (2) organisations where leaders were aware of the unintended negative impacts and accounted for the 
imbalance challenge in how they responded to privacy threats. In fact, when asked how they measured the 
effectiveness of their safeguards, unaware leaders indicated that there were no formal metrics in place to 
assess the impacts and consequences, intended or unintended, of privacy safeguard enactment. Instead, 
they relied on the number of complaints or reported privacy breaches as an indication of the effectiveness 
of their privacy safeguards. Once these leaders became aware of the unintended adverse impacts, they 
considered revisiting their safeguards to account for the imbalance challenge. In these instances, 
awareness only happened when privacy compliance became an issue for the organisation. Clearly, this is 
a dangerous and suboptimal approach, because it relies on reactive assessment of negative privacy 
breaches. If the organisations’ privacy compliances were not in jeopardy, would the leaders have ever 
become aware of any unintended adverse impacts? Moreover, such an approach waits for catastrophic 
privacy breaches to further inform policy development. 
Additional analysis revealed that leaders who were aware of the unintended adverse impacts 
performed some sort of privacy risk assessment a priori instead of waiting for breaches to occur. Such 
initiatives enabled leaders to look out for these impacts and sometimes to prevent or minimise them. 
Ultimately, a proactive assessment versus a reactive approach distinguishes these two types of 
organisations and further explains the imbalance challenge. Indeed, organisations that take a proactive 
approach try to develop privacy metrics (see Appendix H) to assess unintended adverse impacts and 
therefore limit workarounds and increase the level of their overall privacy compliance.  
Research Contributions and Implications 
To date, most studies on privacy focus on designing and implementing the appropriate safeguards 
to mitigate information privacy threats. The key limitation of this literature, however, is that it generally 
assumes only expected positive consequences and does not consider negative consequences or unintended 
consequences. Hence, this research lacks a realistic grounding in actual healthcare privacy practice. 
Accordingly, there have been recent calls for research to investigate the effectiveness and consequences 
of enacting privacy safeguards; as Belanger & Crossler (2011) point out: ‘there are many behavioural 
questions to be explored with respect to not only use of potential privacy protection tools but also 
effectiveness and consequences of use’ (p. 1022). Similarly, this void in extant privacy literature is also 
identified in an interdisciplinary literature review by Smith et al. (2011), which highlights the need for 
more privacy research to consider actual outcomes. By using an interpretive approach, our study was able 
to capture and gain insights into how healthcare executives understand the process by which individual 
privacy safeguards are evaluated and subsequently bypassed and the resulting influences on the 
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organisation’s privacy compliance. This led to the development of our emergent theoretical framework, 
the UCPSE framework. 
Methodologically, using grounded theory provides a rich lens through which to understand the 
consequences of privacy safeguards and their implications for privacy compliance. We selected grounded 
theory because of the lack of extant theory to explain how organisations interpret the implications of 
privacy safeguards, the context of the healthcare domain provides practical relevance and suitability to 
study healthcare processes. This grounded theory study spanned over 16 months, during which we 
interviewed 30 privacy leaders from several healthcare organisations, including government agencies, 
uncovering subtle organisational dynamics that would not have emerged through quick data collection 
techniques such as online surveys. The ability to revisit the interview questions and the target population 
to include more pertinent questions and informants was crucial for reaching data saturation.  
This study contributes to the need for interdisciplinary research by converging the research 
streams of both IS and health informatics, uncovering the challenges that healthcare organisations face 
and presenting an in-depth overview of privacy management within the healthcare domain. In doing so, 
we uncovered and defined the rich construct of the imbalance challenge. In contrast to previous research 
involving balance theory and privacy calculus, we make the case for the uniqueness of the imbalance 
challenge and why a new theoretical framework (the UCPSE) was needed to understand it. Contrary to 
the balance theory’s expectation of detachment, our data indicated that once healthcare leaders become 
aware of unintended impacts, they work to resolve those adverse impacts rather than distance themselves 
from them. In other words, in situations in which privacy safeguards were in the way of healthcare 
delivery, healthcare leaders increased their involvement rather than reduced it.  
Likewise, the consumer theory of privacy calculus also does not fit well, because the imbalance 
challenge pertains to consequences of these decisions at the organisation level. Privacy calculus allows 
the individual to ‘calculate’ whether it is beneficial to engage in a transaction, whereas in the UCPSE 
framework, organisations do not calculate but deal with the consequences in the form of the imbalance 
challenge. The imbalance challenge results when the unintended negative impacts outweigh the intended 
positive impacts. Hence, whereas the imbalance challenge does consider costs and benefits, it does not do 
so from the same lens or individual-level assumptions seen in privacy calculus. Hence, privacy calculus is 
not an accurate theoretical lens to fully understand the imbalance challenge. We contribute to key 
theoretical products that are highly contextualised and unique to the healthcare privacy context: namely, a 
rich construct (the imbalance challenge) and a framework (the UCPSE framework). Hassan & Lowry 
(2015) explain how original IS theory cannot emerge without richly contextualised constructs, because 
the core of theory is in its unique constructs. Interestingly, they also explain how grounded theory is an 
excellent starting place for concepts and constructs to emerge so that they lack superficiality. Meanwhile, 
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they explain how frameworks are highly useful in setting out the territory for research, including its key 
constructs and their relationships. 
Finally, none of these insights would be possible without conducting organisational-level data 
collection on privacy issues, which is rarely done. This research provides new theoretical insights into 
understanding privacy management by targeting the organisation level of analysis through a grounded 
theory approach. In the IS field, Smith et al. (2011) make an explicit call for research on studying 
information privacy at the organisation level (p. 1006): 
Indeed, most rigorous studies of organisational privacy policies and practices would likely 
include a set of exhaustive interviews with an organisation’s members and stakeholders, and 
some amount of deep process tracing would also likely be involved. Such studies are the best 
approach to uncovering the somewhat subtle organisational dynamics that drive privacy policies 
and practices. 
Thus, while collecting organisational-level data, we carefully evaluated it through Strauss and Corbin’s 
(1998) and Corbin and Strauss’ (2008) eight evaluative criteria for the empirical grounding (Appendix F) 
and seven criteria for judging a grounded theory research process (Appendix G).  
Implications and Suggestions for Healthcare Professionals 
The dynamics between enacting privacy safeguards and ensuring privacy compliance constitute a 
major concern for healthcare executives. We investigate this relationship by introducing the imbalance 
challenge, which perspective encourages healthcare practitioners to evaluate intended and unintended 
consequences of privacy safeguards enactments. The imbalance challenge is the result of unintended 
consequences outweighing intended consequences of privacy safeguards enactments. Such imbalance 
may lead to workarounds that can be counterintuitive to the privacy safeguards in place.   
To minimise the imbalance challenge, first we propose that practitioners embrace a proactive 
approach in their privacy safeguards enactment. Such approach should start by instating a privacy impact 
assessment tool (See Appendix H) supplemented with a column that tracks the impact and/or 
workarounds of each item on business practices. Such approach creates an environment of awareness and 
monitoring.  Furthermore, healthcare practitioners should strive to develop a culture of continuous, rather 
than one-time privacy risk assessment that examines the cycle of threats, actions and impact. To facilitate 
this continuous assessment, we propose establishing triggers to alert administrators of common conditions 
that may indicate workarounds may be occurring. As illustration, when a nurse or physician is not logged 
in while present during his/her shift, an alert should be established for further investigation as the 
nurse/physician may be using someone else’s login credentials. Likewise, if a nurse or physician is logged 
in past his/her shit that would indicate the possibility of accidental open access to their account, which 
should also be investigated. 
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Second, our data analysis reveals different level of workarounds from legitimate, less legitimate 
to illegitimate. We propose that practitioners embrace this distinction as workarounds to save lives are 
very distinct from workarounds to save time or workarounds that involve malicious data abuse. Hence, 
accounting for and/or revisiting privacy safeguards to create a ‘break the glass’ feature – when lives are 
involved. ‘Break the glass’ is an escape mechanism that allows certain users to escape the domain 
constraint (Lovis et al., 2007) and thereby bypass role-based access control privacy mechanisms. Through 
‘break the glass,’ the physician would justify his or her need to access a particular patient’s information 
and he will be granted access.  
Third, practitioners should re-evaluate their policies and privacy processes by involving all 
stakeholders including but not limited to physicians, nurses, administrators, insurance companies, and 
business associates.  For example when privacy policy or process is impacting 40% of a nurse work by 
having to log in and log off when she see the patient, when she leaves to get medication and when she 
gets back to administer several times a day, he/she will embrace workarounds such as leaving her 
computer logged in. The more different stakeholders are involved in the practice of privacy, the less 
likelihood of negative consequences. This is also why mere privacy policies alone (unless developed with 
stakeholders and carefully monitored and enforced) can be highly superficial and virtually meaningless to 
an organization. What is needed is real privacy advocacy and protection built as a process into an 
organization, and led by senior management.  
It is important for healthcare executives to understand that an effective way to minimize the 
imbalance challenge begins with efforts to minimize the unintended consequences.  Through the above 
discussed implications, our study has created a preliminary benchmark by which healthcare executives 
can better account for unintended consequences and ultimately achieve privacy compliance.  
Study Limitations and Future Research Opportunities 
This study has several limitations that suggest future research opportunities. Regarding the 
validity of an emergent theory, it is worth referring to generalisability, which is ‘the validity of a theory in 
a setting different from the one where it was empirically tested and confirmed’ (Lee & Baskerville, 2003, 
p. 221). Lee & Baskerville (2003) clarify that the appropriate type of generalisability (not only statistical) 
should be applied to this particular type of theory-development study. The purpose of our study was not 
to achieve statistical validation but to discover patterns for the purpose of theory building and to gain a 
better understanding of the main issues in this context. It is reasonable to assume that the insights from 
this emergent framework would guide future research to a more formal theory (Orlikowski, 1993). Hence, 
additional data collection and testing are needed to further clarify this study’s findings and to formalise its 
framework into theory. Likewise, more empirical and theoretical work is needed that more closely 
examines the relationships among privacy safeguard enactment, the imbalance challenge, workarounds 
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and privacy compliance. In doing so, longitudinal data would be useful so that a better understanding of 
the underlying casual mechanisms can emerge. 
Moreover, another limitation of this study is that the findings are based solely on the U.S. 
hospitals. There could be differences in other countries because of differences in legal systems and basic 
economic structures. Moreover, some IS researchers demonstrate that there are differences in information 
privacy issues across countries and cultures (Milberg et al., 2000; Bellman et al., 2004; Posey et al., 
2010; Lowry et al., 2011). Hence, another research opportunity would be a comparative study of the 
factors impacting this imbalance, taking into consideration country and cultural influences. 
Finally, several of the phenomena we observed can be further studied in terms of lower-order 
causal mechanisms and IT artefacts. As an example, we showed that the presence of accountability is a 
positive privacy facilitation factor in several organisations. However, no one has studied the lower-order 
components of accountability in this privacy context. Accountability theory proposes several mechanisms 
that increase accountability perceptions and subsequent organisational policy compliance (Vance et al., 
2013, 2015): identifiability, expectation of evaluation, awareness of monitoring and social presence. 
Vance et al. empirically validate these and tie them to IT artefact design in security compliance settings. 
Similar IT artefact, design-oriented research could be highly useful in a healthcare domain, especially 
because many medical systems have broad access so that many different medical practitioners can access 
patient information.  
Conclusion 
The recent literature suggests that most extant information privacy research focuses on the 
creation of privacy safeguards and neglects the actual consequences of enacting the practices in which 
organisations engage. An imbalance challenge occurs when the unintended consequences outweigh the 
intended consequences of privacy safeguard enactment. To address the imbalance challenge, 
organisations need to achieve a balance between privacy and utility, meeting privacy requirements 
without impeding workflows. Using an interpretive grounded theory research approach, this study 
investigates the consequences of privacy safeguards and their effects on meeting privacy requirements 
without impeding workflow in medical practices. 
This research responds to a theoretical challenge that was overlooked in prior research, and it 
makes several contributions. First, it introduces a theoretical framework (the UCPSE) that explicates the 
process by which both the intended and unintended consequences of implementing privacy safeguards are 
evaluated and bypassed and the impacts on organisational privacy compliance. Second, this study was 
designed to gain an in-depth understanding of the actual outcomes and implications of privacy safeguards 
in healthcare organisations. Therefore, using a grounded theory methodology provides a rich lens to 
understand the actual consequences of privacy safeguards and their implications for privacy compliance. 
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Recognising the state of imbalance where unintended consequences outweigh intended consequences 
constitutes a strong conceptual foundation for the impacts of enacting privacy safeguards. Third, this 
research contributes to the recent call for interdisciplinary research by converging the research streams of 
both IS and health informatics and presents an in-depth view of privacy management within the 
healthcare domain. Fourth, this study responds to the lack of organisation-level privacy research and 
provides new theoretical insights into understanding privacy management by targeting this under-
researched level of analysis through a grounded theory approach.  
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Appendix A. Summary of Data Sources 
 
Organisation 
Organisation 
Type 
Informant 
# Title 
1 Large Hospital 1 Chief Medical Information Officer 
2 Medium Hospital 2 Chief Information Officer 
3 Chief Privacy Officer 
3 Large  4 Chief Medical Information Officer 
4 Healthcare Association 5 President 
5 Healthcare Federal Agency 6 Chief Privacy Officer 
6 Medium Hospital 7 Vice President of IT 
7 Medium Hospital 8 Chief Privacy Officer 
9 Security Officer 
8 Large Hospital 10 Chief Privacy Officer 
11 Privacy Officer 
9 EMR vendor and cloud 
manager 
12 Vice President Implementations 
10 Small Hospital 13 Chief Executive Officer 
11 Medium Hospital 14 IT Director 
12 Large Hospital 15 Security Officer 
13 Medium Hospital 16 Privacy Officer 
14 Research/Consulting Firm 17 Chief Privacy Officer 
15 Small Hospital 18 Privacy Officer 
19 IT Director 
16 Large Hospital 20 Privacy Officer 
17 Large Hospital 21 Security Officer 
18 Consulting Firm 22 Chief Executive Officer 
19 Small Hospital 23 Chief Information Officer 
20 Medium Hospital 24 Chief Information Officer 
21 Small Hospital 25 Business Executive Director 
26 Vice President 
27 Director of Health Information 
Management 
28 Healthcare Executive Director 
29 Privacy Officer 
30 IT Director 
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Appendix B. Interview Protocol 
The protocol for interviewing information privacy informants followed the following five steps: 
• Step1: The first author explained in detail the purpose of the study, confidentiality of the data 
collected and the option to opt out and/or not respond to questions they judged sensitive. 
• Step 2: We use semi-structured interviews format. Sample questions related to this particular study 
are listed below: 
• What types of measures does your organisation have in place to handle the 
threat of privacy issues? Were you subject to ant data breach? 
• Are there any implementation/impact issues of these measures? 
• What type of business conflicts (workflow conflicts) does you 
organisation face in developing and enacting these privacy programs? 
• How does your organisation balance between its day-to-day operations 
and privacy policies’ implementation? 
• Step 3: The first author recorded and transcribed all interviews 
• Steps 4: Following each interview, we documented impressions and patterns 
• Steps 5: We reviewed recordings and transcripts which led to more detailed questions with 
subsequent interviews 
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Appendix C. Semi–Structured Interview Questions 
This study is part of a dissertation work completed by the first author. Questions have been 
expanded as new categories emerged. Not all questions pertain to this study. 
1. General Information 
a. Interviewee background 
i. Title(s) 
ii. Education background 
iii. Years in profession 
iv. How did you end up in this position 
b. Definition/scope of information privacy 
i. Definition of information privacy 
ii. Is it similar to information security? Why? Why not? 
c. Privacy issues facing healthcare organisations in general 
i. Different Types, levels 
ii. Challenges 
2. Privacy Measures 
a. What types of measures does your organisation have in place to handle the threat of privacy 
issues? Were you subject to ant data breach? 
b. How long have you had these programs in place? 
c. Would your hospital consider adding other privacy measures in the future? Why or why 
not? 
d. What might these new measures address? 
e. Do you have privacy impact assessment tools that help you determine if you are meeting 
your legal, technical and policies obligations toward EHRs privacy? 
f. How do you measure your privacy compliance? 
3. Influencing Factors and Values 
a. Why do you respond to privacy threats? 
b. What factors would influence your organisation to initiate these particular measures? 
(What prompted your hospital to initiate these measures?) 
c. Are your organisation’s privacy measures designed to comply mainly with HIPAA and 
HITECH?  
d. Are there other regulations that you have to comply with?  
e.  Are there any other internal and external factors that dictate how you design your privacy 
programs? 
f. What type of resources (human/financial) does the organisation invest in to develop 
privacy policies and programs? 
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g. Are there different degrees of compliance (reactive/proactive/other)? Where are you 
situated and why? 
h. What type of resources would you need to further your commitment to privacy? 
i. Which type of measure would you invest more on if you have extra resources?  
4. Privacy Implementation Issues/ Practices/Enactment 
a. How is privacy practiced? Is it different from one setting (clinical) to others?  
b. What type of business conflicts (workflow conflicts) does you organisation face in 
developing and enacting these privacy programs? 
c. What do you do when there is a conflict between your medical clinical work flow and 
mandates from regulations?  
d. How does your organisation balance between its day-to-day operations and privacy policies’ 
implementation? 
e. How does training and education align with routing activities? Does it support actual 
practices or it is informational (awareness)? 
f. Are you a part of any HIMSS or CHIME chapters? Do you ever use your associations with 
these chapters to raise privacy mandates that are in conflict with your workflow processes? 
Has it ever been lobbied? 
g. Under what scenario, would an organisation not comply with regulations? 
h. How do you balance privacy with convenience (for employees and for patients) 
5. Privacy Design 
a. What is the inputs of users into the design and development of privacy programs 
b. Is patients’ feedback sought at any point in time with these privacy programs? 
c. Is there a particular relationship with your vendors, what is the impact of vendors into 
embedding security and privacy features into the software? 
6. Concluding Questions 
a. Are there other issues related to privacy programs that we haven’t discussed but that would 
be important for me to know? 
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Appendix D. Illustrative Supporting Data for Unintended Consequences 
2nd Order  
Themes Illustrative 1
st Order Data 
Unintended/Desirable Consequences 
Standardization of 
Work Processes 
• ‘For us privacy we consider a component of quality healthcare. In other words, 
patients come to us and divulge very private information to us, and we are the 
protectors of that. We must make sure that it’s handled appropriately … provide 
them basic stuff of making sure people close curtains, close doors, they position 
their computers and equipment so that people can’t read or see the information’. 
• ‘Say you had your Facebook account and you decide you want to say something 
bad about [our hospital], what do you do then? There has to be some procedures 
and protocols around that’. 
• ‘In an emergency department or you are in a clinic setting, information being 
electronically viewable so you have to say where the device is, where the devices 
set up, the time outs and things, are they consistent with a comprehensive 
approach to visually securing any information ‘ 
• ‘We have to assess each outside agency as to what their needs are and how to best 
set a special, private VPN channel that’s highly secured that we only allow people 
in through that area that we can govern who comes in, when they come in, what 
their passwords are and so forth. And we can govern the movement of the data 
that way’. 
Better Accountability 
• ‘You basically have to assess the situation, make the determination of what should 
be done. I will be honest with you. We will opt for patient safety and patient care 
above everything…the patient’s life is in our hands and we are going to do what it 
takes to take care of that patient’. 
• ‘I believe that most organisations now are much more aware of privacy and 
security than they were before that law came into place. And just seeing this as 
just a good business practice instead of something we have to do, makes all the 
difference in the world. I have heard some of the techy people call it hygienic 
environment’. 
• ‘I try to make decisions here of course I want to do what’s right for the business 
and our workflow. But at the same time at the end of the day I kind of put myself 
in a patient’s viewpoint’. 
• I do think that there are a number of motivating factors. One of them is the right 
thing to do and that is the right attitude, and that would get you a lot further than 
going off checking off check boxes 
Unintended Adverse Consequences 
Information 
Unavailability 
• ‘We don’t want to keep information out of the hands of people who need it. So if 
we develop something that is too stringent…they can’t do their job the right way’. 
•  ‘We try to make it [information] as accessible as possible but yet have security 
measures in place to protect those assets’. 
•  ‘We have lots of policies and everybody else has lots of policies but we can’t 
meet the regulations in the strictest letter of the law and offer clinicians their 
ability to practice in an efficient cost effective manner’. 
•  ‘I would much rather happen to explain to the office of civil rights why some 
body inappropriately access information than explain to a family why their loved 
one is dead and they wouldn’t have been dead had the information we had in our 
possession wasn’t accessible to the people treating that patient’ 
Workflow Disruption 
• ‘Time out features. There’s times out in all our system end this is something we 
have to work around. You know we have some key systems in the emergency 
department and what they’re saying … We have a twenty minute time out 
feature … if I’m a doctor in the emergency room and my system times out on me 
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while I am critically working on a patient … I have to [enter] my password, that’s 
not a good thing’. 
• ‘Once I log in, I don’t want the system to log me out automatically. I don’t like it’. 
•  ‘I’m using application A, application B and you get all these passwords you got to 
remember. Guess what? I’m going to start writing them down’. 
•  ‘40% of the work that a nurse does is to administer medication. 40% of her day, 
she is looking at pills and administering them. … She is logging in and waiting, 
waiting, waiting, waiting, that’s a problem she is not going to get her job done. It’s 
hard enough to do the charting, administering medicine without the waiting, 
waiting, and waiting. So what most hospitals do is there have these computers on 
wheels, they wheel it into the patient room and they leave it logged on and they 
administer the medicine and they wheel it out and they leave it logged on and then 
they go into the next room and then leave it logged on but when they go back to 
the med room it’s logged on and that’s a security risk’. 
Usability Issues 
• ‘It comes from EHR usability and access to information. I mean in certain 
scenarios, I would like to walk in from purely a clinician hat on, I like to walk into 
to room and see that patient’ information , talk with that patient and provide the 
care .but somehow I have to be acknowledge as being allowed to see that 
information. So, that one of the conflicts. I have to log in or else I have to use an 
RFID tag or swipe something to get into that record’. 
• ‘With the privacy and security in healthcare it’s the need for speed. I don’t want to 
log in twice. I don’t want to log in this, I don’t want to that’. 
• ‘If it is not usable to them, they won’t use it. The things that are very usable to 
them, that they are used to, they can, I’ve seen this all the time’. 
Operational Feasibility 
• ‘My biggest concern time comes down to operational feasibility and weather 
what’s being asked can be operationalized or is it going to be detrimental to the 
patient best interest’. 
• ‘It really comes down to practice’. 
• ‘There is a lot of indirect impact that you have to be careful of its operational 
efficiency you know you have to really look at, you will never get a number you 
look and say oh my God. It’s got to be costing us money or it’s got to be costing 
us efficiency’. 
•  ‘So it does have an impact on resources and operation. You’re going to get to a 
point where people are going to have to have staff in place to just deal with that 
one situation, just to keep up with what they’re going to have to do to make sure 
they protect themselves’.  
•  ‘Let’s just say for example, your brother is Don Parks and you are a physician, 
and you are looking up Don Parks’ records for no reason what so ever. An alert is 
triggered and will be sent to someone who actually sponsors your account. It is 
going to say Rachida Parks looked at Don Parks’ record. The person that sponsors 
you will need to get with you and say who is that? You might say that is my 
brother, and one might say, why did you look at that record? You would say he 
was not looking good at the family dinner last week, so I looked up his record, 
which will be totally inappropriate. Or you could say, Don parks is not related to 
me, but is a patient of mine. The alerting provokes the next level of inquiry. If you 
were to say the former where you were looking up at your brother’s record and 
you didn’t really have a reason to, then that gets referred to the human resources 
for discipline’. 
• ‘We got to make sure the things are operationally supportable and I have to say 
that there are aspects of HIPAA that are very difficult to operationalize and they 
really often don’t have a lot of meaning either’. 
• ‘We have lots of policies we can’t meet the regulations in the strictest letter of the 
law and offer clinicians their ability to practice in an efficient cost effective 
manner’. 
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Appendix E. Illustrative Supporting Data for Intended or Expected Consequences 
2nd Order  
Themes Illustrative 1st Order Data 
Intended/Desirable Consequences 
Controlled Access 
• ‘We do have role based security, if we decided that you should have rights to 
getting at certain class of data, we can give it you...That’s very important because 
you don’t want to give employees any more access than what they need’. 
• ‘Basically what we do is we look at the information system and based on the 
security capabilities and the information system and the duties, or the 
responsibilities or the duties of the employee, we, we give, we base their access on 
that’. 
• ‘We go through our due diligence in regard to what different provider groups are 
allowed to see or should be able to see for their job, they don’t want to stop them 
from providing care for patients obviously and you want to facilitate their care for 
patients but do you really have a true clinic need to be able to do that’. 
• ‘So do you want the environmental health worker to be able to log in to your record 
and see that? Well no, but there may be component of your records that are 
important to the environmental health workers to do their job’. 
Deterrence Effect 
• ‘I hate to say this, a certain amount of people get caught, you know people deciding 
to look at stuff that they shouldn't. Because you also want to make an example out 
of them, you know it’s sad to say, what really helps if no one looks at it, and if no 
one looks at things that they shouldn’t, that’s the ideal. You know that’s not going 
to happen. So what you do hope is that when people do look at things they 
shouldn’t, they get caught, we work very hard on that, and when they get caught, 
people find out about them. It’s the deterrent effect’. 
• ‘It is sort of user grisly analogy. Back in medieval England when they chop 
people’s heads off, they would put the head on a pike, and they stick it on the 
London Bridge, and the idea was that it would allow you to see who had their head 
chopped off. It was a very public hanging. And so, it’s the same thing here, we 
can’t necessarily say who we fire, but you hope the word gets out, you hope the 
employee that gets fired almost says, I can’t believe they fired me for looking at 
that. Well okay fine, I want you to tell your co-workers, because I want your co-
workers to say, I am not going to do this again because I don’t want to have the 
same thing happen to me, or I don’t want to be suspended’. 
• ‘We need to discipline them, we need to make sure that people understand that we 
take this seriously, and hopefully, there is a deterrent effect that occurs from other 
people seeing the fact that people have lost their jobs over. Now the fact that only 
three people in that hospital lost their jobs over it, probably it says to me only good 
thing, because it says to me only three people were dumb enough to look at the 
record’. 
Tracking Mechanisms 
• ‘We have alerts built in to things, there are alerts for certain people when there is a 
perceived attack or perceived breach so to speak’. 
• ‘We have software which goes through every PC in the house every day looking for 
things on PCs. So we have software in place on emails that look for certain patterns 
of information of people are trying to send out here it will block it’. 
• ‘Our system is all doing very advanced logging, and if I decided that I wanted to 
see who looked at your record, I would know everybody who looked at your 
record’. 
• ‘So anybody who goes in and looks at a record of same, the same last name that’s, 
that’s a flag. It doesn’t mean it’s inappropriate. It just means that we need to look at 
those a little bit closer’. 
• ‘A system behind the scenes looking at these audit models that are being generated 
continuously and let’s look for patterns or let’s look for, let’s look for trends or 
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patterns that you know doesn’t appear to be right and they need to be investigated 
on’. 
Expected Adverse consequences 
User Resistance 
• ‘If there’s a change in the regulation or policy, existing business process has to be 
altered or changed. Any time there’s change there’s going to be push back or 
potential disagreement’. 
• ‘If the security is too hard, people wouldn’t do it. If it is beyond their work flow 
much, they won’t do it’. 
•  ‘I tell people all the time that security flies in the face of convenience that’s just the 
way it’s always is… so a lot of push back or complain’. 
• ‘Do you want me not to administer that medication because everything didn’t line 
up in the security behind the scenes?’ 
•  
• ‘To use a safe password, is has to be eight characters long, it should have caps and 
this and that, and you change it every thirty days, and nobody does it’. 
Data Disclosures & 
Secondary Use  
• ‘How do you secure information that is being used for secondary purposes for 
research, for research, for quality, for billing and coding’? 
• ‘I think the very difficult issue we face is that there is a great need for secondary 
uses of health data. That’s where much of the information comes from, we are now 
using for research for public health. And so to be able to find cures for diseases or 
to improve public health, to improve disparities, to improve access to care, all those 
many things that are on everyone’s mind. When you’re thinking about healthcare 
improvement, you need data to be able to do that. You need the research’. 
• ‘There’s many times when like a clerical person will hit the wrong number on the 
fax machine and fax a, a lab result for Rachida Parks to a Sheetz store or something 
and you know that happens all the time’. 
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Appendix F. Empirical Grounding of the Study 
Evaluative 
Criteria Description Goal What to look for in this study 
Criterion 1 
Are concepts 
generated? 
 
Assess if the concepts 
used in the research 
are grounded in the 
data. 
The concepts used in the research are 
grounded in the data. Therefore, the study 
could be viewed as fitting with the first 
criterion. 
Criterion 2 
Are the concepts 
systematically 
related? 
Check if there is a 
linkage between 
concept 
The study shows how the concepts have 
been interwoven into more coherent 
themes and categories. 
Criterion 3 
Are there many 
conceptual linkages 
and are the categories 
well developed? Do 
they have conceptual 
density? 
Check if categories 
and subcategories are 
tightly linked. 
Open coding was followed by axial 
coding, which allowed dense categories 
to emerge. The linkage between 
categories was implemented and 
extension of those categories to themes 
and overarching dimensions was pursued 
to achieve conceptual density. 
Criterion 4 
Is much variation 
built into the theory? 
Check for variations 
in the theoretical 
model and different 
conditions and 
consequences. 
This research presents a hybrid of process 
and variance in the theoretical framework 
(Figure 1) that aims to depict the 
processes as a result of enacting privacy 
safeguards. The variance intended and 
unintended consequences 
Criterion 5 
Are the broader 
conditions that affect 
the study built into its 
explanation? 
Incorporate the micro 
and macro 
conditions. 
This study incorporates micro conditions 
that were relevant to the study. The 
incorporation of the leadership 
commitment is a good example of 
integrating micro conditions. 
Criterion 6 
Has process been 
taken into account? 
Check if process has 
been considered. 
This study focuses on understanding the 
outcomes of enacting privacy safeguards 
and their impact om privacy compliance. 
This translates into the processes 
undertaken to handle these outcomes. 
Therefore, the criterion of identifying 
process in research has been achieved. 
Criterion 7 
Do the theoretical 
findings seem 
significant and to 
what extent? 
 
Check for 
imagination and 
insights. 
 
The preliminary findings and a theoretical 
model have been published and well 
received (Parks et al., 2011a; Parks et al., 
2011b); thus, I would regard this as 
evidence in support of their significance. 
Criterion 8 
Does the theory stand 
the test of time and 
become part of the 
discussions and ideas 
exchanged among 
relevant social and 
professional groups? 
Check if the 
theoretical 
framework is able to 
withstand future 
testing and research. 
Given that this study has been developed 
based on a specific context (i.e., 
healthcare), it is our hope that the insights 
of the emerging theory can make it 
withstand future applications and 
research. 
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Appendix G. Research Process Evaluation Criteria  
Evaluative 
Criteria Description What to look for in this study 
Criterion 1 
How was the original sample selected? 
On what grounds? 
Interviewing informants has been initiated in 
hospitals. However, after initial data 
analysis, this target was revisited to include 
other healthcare organisations and entities 
(e.g., the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, healthcare professional 
associations, healthcare IT providers, and 
healthcare privacy consultants). This sample 
was originally based on privacy leaders only 
in hospitals and ultimately included privacy 
leaders from other healthcare-organisations 
who impact the process by which hospitals 
respond to information privacy threats. 
Criterion 2 
What major categories emerged? The study led to the emergence of major 
categories – Enactment of Privacy 
safeguards, intended consequences, 
unintended consequences, Imbalance 
Challenge, Workarounds, and Privacy 
Compliance. 
Criterion 3 
What were some of the events, incidents, 
or actions (indicators) that pointed to 
some of these categories? 
Categories emerged as a result of first and 
second order analysis. For example 
workarounds emerged when leaders 
mentioned their lack of compliance, and 
when healthcare employees embraced 
activities to bypass privacy safeguards. 
Criterion 4 
On the basis of what categories did 
theoretical sampling proceed? That is, 
how did theoretical formulations guide 
some of the data collection? After the 
theoretical sampling was done, how 
representative did the categories prove to 
be? 
 
Theoretical sampling was driven by the 
concepts that emerged. The categories of 
hospitals’ size, Workarounds and the 
Imbalance Challenge created a need to 
collect further data. Ultimately, some 
categories sustained (e.g., Workarounds and 
the Imbalance Challenge) and others did not 
hold up (e.g., hospital size) 
Criterion 5 
What were some of the hypotheses 
pertaining to conceptual relations (i.e., 
among categories), and on what grounds 
were they formulated and validated? 
 
As a qualitative researcher, I came up with 
hypotheses in their initial form in early 
analysis. These hypotheses were formulated 
and based on the interpretations of the data 
collected. Examples of these hypotheses 
include leaders who exhibited very distinct 
behaviours regarding their approaches to 
responding to privacy threats, while others’ 
behaviours were opposite to the ones 
described above.  
 Criterion 6 
Were there instances in which hypotheses 
did not explain what was happening in the 
data? How were these discrepancies 
accounted for? Were hypotheses 
modified? 
 
As the coding continued, categories and 
themes were improved. Some did not hold 
up. For instance, at early stages of data 
analysis, we formulated the hypothesis that 
larger hospitals with more resources would 
thrive to achieve higher degree of privacy 
compliance and better address the imbalance 
issues. We further analysed this pattern to 
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discover that, while the hospital size matters 
because it is often closely linked with 
resources, it is the commitment of top 
managers that prevails. This hypothesis 
eventually was modified to account for the 
role of leadership commitment. 
Criterion 7 
How and why was the core category 
selected? Was this collection sudden or 
gradual, and was it difficult or easy? On 
what grounds were the final analytics 
decisions made? 
 
The Imbalance Challenge gradually emerged 
as the core theme of this study. While other 
categories emerged first, the Imbalance 
Challenge theme emerged as further analysis 
was undertaken. The final analytics decisions 
were made and validated with the empirical 
data. 
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Appendix H: Sample Privacy and Security Assessment Tool 
 
Privacy and Security Assessment Tool 
 
Business Associate Name: Date:  
Specific Requirement Present Absent NA or See Comments Comments 
Privacy Standard 
1) Privacy/confidentiality policies and 
procedures designed to protect [hospital 
name] data. 
    
2) Policy or procedure that describes the 
allowed use and/or disclosure of 
[hospital name] data in accordance with 
the Business Associate Agreement. 
    
3) Procedure for the reporting of any 
suspected or actual intrusion, 
unauthorized use, or disclosure of 
[hospital name] data. 
    
4) A sample of your log of potential or 
actual intrusion, unauthorized use or 
disclosure of [hospital name] data. 
    
5) If required, is the following present: 
Template of the “confidentiality / Non-
disclosure Agreement with the 
subcontractor. 
A list of any off-shore subcontractors 
who have access to [hospital name] 
member data. 
    
6) Procedure that describes how you 
allow for the amendments to [hospital 
name] data. 
    
7) Procedure for tracking non-routine 
disclosures or access of [hospital name] 
data. 
    
8) Documentation that describes your 
HIPAA privacy/security training for staff 
or others who would have access to 
[hospital name] data. 
    
9) A template of the confidentiality 
agreement that you require your 
employees to sign. 
    
10) Procedure that describes how you 
forward privacy questions or privacy 
requests from [hospital name] members 
to [hospital name]. 
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11) Policy requiring contact with 
[hospital name] prior to any use and/or 
disclosure of [hospital name] data 
beyond the defined obligations listed in 
the Business Associate Agreement. 
    
Security Standard 
Administrative Safeguards 
 1) Policy or process for conducting an 
assessment of potential risks and 
vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of [hospital name] data. 
    
 2) Evidence of an assessment of potential 
risks and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of [hospital name] 
data. 
    
 3) Process or procedures for implementing 
security measures to reduce risks and 
vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of [hospital name] data. 
    
 4) Policy or procedure for sanctions due to 
employee violations of your organisation’s 
security policies and procedures. 
    
 5) Process or procedure to regularly review 
records of information system activity, such as, 
audit logs, access reports, and security incident 
tracking reports. 
    
 6) Evidence of an identified and documented 
responsibility of the security official 
accountable for the development and 
implementation of information security 
policies and procedures. 
    
 7) Policy or procedure for protecting [hospital 
name] data from the other functions of the 
larger organisation if health care clearinghouse 
functions are performed. 
    
 8) Policy and/or procedures to address 
security incidents. 
    
 9) Policy and/or procedures for the backup of 
[hospital name] data.  
    
10) Evidence of a formal disaster recovery 
plan. 
    
11) Evidence of testing your disaster recovery 
plan within the last 12 months. 
    
12) Process or procedures to maintain security 
of [hospital name] data while operating in 
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emergency mode due to technical failure or 
power outage. 
13) Procedure for performing periodic 
technical and nontechnical evaluations 
(auditing) to ensure that appropriate security 
has been implemented. (The evaluation may be 
internal or external.) 
    
14) Policy or procedure for reviewing existing 
business associate contracts, which involve 
[hospital name] data, to determine if HIPAA 
Security Rule requirements are addressed. 
    
Physical Safeguards 
 1) Policy and/or procedures for ensuring that 
workstations capable of accessing [hospital 
name] data have been identified, their viewing 
areas limited to authorized users, and have 
been physically removed from areas where 
unauthorized users might see the information.  
    
 2) Policy and/or procedures to ensure physical 
safeguards have been put in place to ensure 
that all servers and workstations that can 
access [hospital name] data are restricted to 
authorized users. 
    
 3) Policy and/or procedure for allowing 
employees or organisations to remove [hospital 
name] data in either paper or electronic form 
from your facility(s). 
    
4) Policy and/or procedure for allowing 
employees access to [hospital name] data from 
a remote location, i.e. home, hotels, or public 
locations. 
    
 5) Policy and/or procedure to address how 
[hospital name] data and software should be 
properly disposed, including any hardware or 
electronic media on which it is stored.  
    
 6) Policy and procedure for removal of 
[hospital name] data from electronic media 
prior to making the media available for re-use.  
    
Technical Safeguards 
 1) Policy and procedure to ensure that each 
user has a unique ID that can be used to track 
user activity within the system.  
    
2) Policy and/or procedure to identify users 
who would require access and to provide 
access to [hospital name] data during 
emergency situations. 
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 3) List and describe the audit control 
mechanisms implemented to record and 
examine activity in the system(s) containing 
[hospital name] data. 
    
 4) List and describe the type of user 
authentication mechanisms currently used to 
ensure user authentication. 
    
View publication stats
